Some history from the early Bantam prototypes to the production model MB.
If it was not for them [Bantam] and their tenacity, we may not have had the jeeps we have today.
Todd Paisley
Bantam's involvement with the jeep dates back to 1932. The Infantry Board of the Quartermaster Corp. (QMC) at Fort Benning, GA were looking into the use of small, lightweight automobiles for military purposes. They purchased an Austin roadster in November for this purpose. They wanted to purchase more, but an internal squabble over who should be procuring automobiles and the lack of funding made this impossible. Nothing much came from this purchase. (Source: QM 400.112 (Automobiles) Austin, IB 451, Infantry Board to Chief Infantry, November 8, 1932, "Austin Car for Test", with succeeding endorsements.)
In 1936, Col. Howie of the Infantry School at Fort Benning came up with an idea for a lightweight reconnaissance car. He spoke with John Albrecht of the Timken-Detroit Axle company about the feasibility of having dual driving axles. He showed his idea to Col. Charles W. Weeks and he allowed $500 from the book shop funds to be used to test his idea. During his off-duty hours, he and Master Sergeant M. J. Wiley put together drawings and fabricated a prototype called the Howie Machine-Gun Carrier (or "belly-flop" since you had to ride it in the prone condition.) He used parts from the salvage yard and most were based on Bantam mechanics. (It is alleged that the 1932 Austin roadster purchase by the Infantry may have been used for this prototype, but it can not be proven.) Tests were performed and while it did OK, it just was not what they were looking for. (Source: Memorandum: "Certificate re History of Development of 1/4 Ton Truck" ,Sworn Statement by Col. Howie to the Adjunctant General, War Department, 23 June, 1943)
In 1938, American Bantam approached the QMC about the possibility of supplying chassis. The QMC purchased 3 2WD chassis for experimental purposes. The results of the test did not prove successful.
Willys-Overland Motors of Toldedo, OH also tried to sell a vehicle as a machine gun or personnel carrier. The offered one or two vehicles to test, but the QM said "no good purpose would be served by making the suggested tests" and nothing came of it. (Source: QM 095 (Willys-Overland Motors Inc., Vol. 1, Detroit QMC Motor Planning office to the QMG, December 28, 1938)
In September 1939, Bantam offered additional chassis for further tests, but the QMC declined and they were informed that "this type of chassis appeared to have no further military use". Some factions in the QM considered the Bantam important, while others thought of it as only a toy. Bantam did not give up and they sent a letter to the Secretary of War and recognition was then given to them. In this letter, they told of a survey they put together (at Bantam's expense) of cars being used in Europe by other armies. In this letter they originated the idea of the jeep and got the sympathetic ear of the Secretary. After this letter, Bantam was now recognized as "producing a product of tremendous value". The QMC now agreed with the War Secretary. (Source: QM 451 (Proc 398-41-9), Letter of Charles H. Payne, Asst. To the President, American Bantam Car Company to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, October 14, 1940)
Charles Payne of Bantam and the Chief of Infantry of the QM put together the requirements for a light, low car to replace motorcycles. (Source: QM 400.112 (Vehicle Motor Light), CI 470.8/550 XII "C", Chief of Infantry to Adjutant General, "Light Vehicle Development", June 6, 1940) Afterwards, the Quartermaster General (QMG) suggested that Holabird (the QM testing facility) investigate the light passenger car of the American Bantam Company as a possible solution to this problem.
On June 19 , a special committee met with the officials and engineers of Bantam at their Butler, PA plant to discuss the possibility and limitations of the Bantam chassis as a basis for the proposed command-reconnaissance car. Several of the regular 2WD cars were put through a brief test, including runs over hilly country carrying one or two men with a gross load of 1500 lbs. They performed well. To test the car's structural integrity, a stripped dry chassis weighing 680 lbs was statically loaded with 4500 lbs of sand without damage to the chassis. After those tests, a discussion of the engineering details resulted in a decision for the Bantam to have:
They recommended that 70 vehicles be procured and tested. (40 for the Infantry, 20 for the Calvary and 10 for the Field Artillery). Those that attended the meetings at Bantam included Major Howie (Armed Force Liaison Officer, who brought along his designs for the Howie Machine-Gun Carrier), Mr. Robert F. Brown (civilian engineer of the Holabird Quartermaster Depot) , John Albrecht (Field Engineer, Timken-Detroit Axle Company), engineer from Spicer Corporation, Mr. Fenn (Bantam President), Mr. Payne (contract negotiator) and Karl Probst (Chief Engineer, Bantam). Mr Howie, Mr Albrecht and the engineer from Spicer sketched the design for the front axle setup. (Source: QM 400.112: Notes, Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to The Ordnance Committee, Technical Staff, "Light Infantry and Cavalry Vehicles", June 22, 1940)
During this meeting Bantam and Spicer worked out the details for the drivetrain and $130,000 was given to Spicer for the tooling costs.
On July 2, some specifications were changed:
(Source: QM 400.112: (Vehicle, Motor Light) Chief of Infantry to "Light Vehicle Development", 4th endorsement, Holabird to QMG, July 3, 1940)
In the meantime, Bantam had gone ahead with the laying out of the jeep in accordance with the rough sketch and general specifications arrived at between its engineers and the Ordnance Subcommittee at their June 19 conference. On several occasions it was necessary for the Bantam engineers to visit Holabird to iron out different engineering matters. The Spicer Manufacturing Company of Toledo, OH also was called in by Bantam for consultation of the four-wheel-drive system. Both the Bantam people and Holabird agreed that the standard Bantam motor would have to be stepped up in power resulting in a engine developed by Continental Motors Corporation. (Source: "Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, U.S. Senate, 77th Congress, August 6, 1941 also known as the Truman Committee Hearings, testimony of Francis H. Penn, President of American Bantam Company)
Bantam now offered to negotiate a contract with the QMC for $2500 per jeep, making it $125,000, the exact amount authorized by the War Department. The QM refused and in a July 10 letter to the Assistant Secretary of War requesting approval for the issuance of a 10-day advertisement of bids. The QMG considered the Bantam offer "reasonable for a development program" but since it involved tooling costs, it felt that "acceptance would place the firm at a decided advantage over competitors in possible future procurement of this type vehicle". While noting that the preliminary development of the jeep had been accomplished with the collaboration of Bantam, the QMG believed it advisable to resort to a competitive bidding procedure in order to "permit any other qualified and interested producers to submit bids". The letter also stated that the QMG knew of only one other bidder. (Source: QM 451 (398-41-9), Current Procurement Branch to the ASW, "Procurement of Trucks, Light Reconnaissance and Command Cars, -ton, 4x4", July 10, 1940)
When the bids were opened, the competitor to Bantam was announced to be Willys-Overland. Ford was not interested in building the jeep at the time, but it kept an eye on the situation.
Willys submitted a crude sketch of a design but it was not as detailed as Bantam's submission. A technical analysis of the bids revealed that although the Willys bid was nominally lower, when you added the damages applied because they could not meet the 75-day delivery date, Bantam's bid was better. On July 25, the contract for 70 jeeps was awarded to Bantam. (Source: QM 451 (Proc. 398-41-9), Holabird to the QMG, "Invitation for Bids No. 398-41-9", July 24, 1940; Technical Analysis, QMG to Holabird, July 25, 1940; QMG to Commissioner Knudson, "Contract with American Bantam", July 30, 1940)
In accordance with the agreement in the bid, Bantam built and delivered the first pilot model, th MKI, to Holabird in 49 days. When the pilot model arrived, it was given a laboratory of technical and engineering inspections. Then came a series of field tests which included:
During these tests, representatives from Ford and Willys where given free access (without any question, without any interference, or anything else) to the Bantam prototype. The QM considered the design to be their property and the blueprints were given to both companies. (This would later negate the little advantage Bantam may have had since they had access to the details.) (Source: Truman Committee Hearings, Testimony of Francis H. Fenn, President, American Bantam, August 6, 1941; Substantiated by: Testimony of Lt. Col. Edwin S. Van Duesen, Chief, Procurement Branch, Motor Transport Division, QMC, August 6, 1941)
After these tests, a conference was set up between Bantam and the QM engineers. Changes where proposed and agreed upon. After this conference, the QM ordered Bantam to proceed with the construction of the remaining 69 vehicles, the MK II.
When an additional 1,500 vehicles were to be procured, it was decided that they would be split up between the three companies. Bantam got wind of the QM possibly ordering jeeps from Willys and Ford and sent a series of protests to the Secretary of War. In the first one, they reviewed the history of the jeep development and claimed that Bantam "had developed the jeep for the Army with no other automobile manufacturer contributing one iota to its successful completion." They also mentioned the enthusiasm of the Army over the development, which could be easily verified. They also pointed out that they devoted their entire factory to the production of the jeep during the development phase, while Willys and Ford continued their regular production. It also mentioned it had the most small car knowledge and that their facility should be more than enough to meet the Army's demand, provided the bottleneck with Spicer cleared up. The offered that "should the time arrive that Bantam was not able to fill Army demands, We would be glad and willing to turn over all detail drawings and other help to other automobile manufacturers in the interest of National Defense". (Source: QM 451 (Proc 398-41-9), Charles H. Payne, Asst. To President, American Bantam Car Company, to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, October 14, 1940)
The QMG sharply protested buying the 1,500 from Bantam since he considered the Bantam jeep not to be a pilot model, but "a preliminary engineering model". He also considered the body design to be furnished by Holabird and the axles and transfer case by Spicer Mfg. Corporation. (Source: QM 451 (M-P) (398-41-9), QMG to AG, "Procurement of Fifteen Hundred (1,500) Trucks, 1.4-ton (4x4) Light Reconnaissance Trucks", November 1, 1940)The Infantry representative objected to the purchase from Ford and Willys of a thousand vehicles "which have never been seen, much less tested". They said the Bantam "has been engineered, thoroughly tested, and found satisfactory". The also said "It is the only instance known to the undersigned of any vehicle manufacturer cooperating to this extent. The past attitudes of Ford and Willys has been one of indifference to the special requirements of the military service. It does not seem either in the interest of the government or consistent to fair play to discourage Bantam in such efforts by failing to give them the support to which their initiative and cooperative attitude entitle them." (Source: "Proceedings of Motor Transport Sub-Committee, QMC Technical Committee" Infantry Nonconcurrence, October 21, 1940)The Field Artillery representative also recommended going only with Bantam.
It was looking like Bantam was going to get the 1,500 vehicle order when the QMG sent a memorandum to General R.C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 stating that the QMC would now obtain 1,500 jeeps from Bantam. But he added "of course, you understand that this proposal must be approved by the National Advisory Commission and the QMG wishes to go on record that he did not consider the directed action in the best interest of the government" and that Bantam's financial status was inadequate. He also went on to state that multiple source where advantageous to the government in an event of an emergency. (Source: QM 451 (M-P) (Proc. 398-41-9), QMG to General R.C. Moore, November 6, 1940) The commission was consulted and it stated "We believe the division between at least two source desirable". It was then decided that 4,500 be ordered, 1.500 each from Bantam, Willys and Ford.
In the cases of Ford and Willys, they had to produce a pilot model that was acceptable before the could go ahead with the rest of their production. Ford completed their design before Willys. The Ford Pygmy was powered by a Ford tractor engine with a Model A transmission. The weight was more than the requirements so the QM upped the weight limit. When Willys submitted their design , the Quad, they upped it again! The press cried foul. Mr. Fenn, the president of Bantam, was quoted "I would have to add pig-iron to my vehicle to make that limit!"
The Willy and Ford prototypes where tested, changes made and 1,500 each of the Bantam MK II, Willys MA and Ford GP where produced.
When the QMC picked Ford as the winner of the tests , a firestorm of protests erupted from the press. One very vocal columnist was I.F. Stone of PM magazine. He was a very strong supporter of Bantam and reported the secret deal between Ford and Spicer. Although Bantam and Spicer worked out the ultimate design of the axles and transfer case, when Ford came into the picture, a secret deal between them and Spicer gave Ford the priority on these axles. Ford gave them some additional tooling to help them out because of a problem Spicer had with delivering axles on time. Bantam sometimes had a five-six week backlog because they could not get the axles from Spicer! (Source: I.F. Stone, "Army Alters "Midget" Car to Please Henry Ford", PM, January 19, 1941)
Also the labor movement at the time was very vocal against the inclusion of Ford. The Butler, PA area at the time was deep in unemployment. Ford had a large number of defense contracts at the time and they could have easily received other contracts other than the jeep. Because of the press and labor movement attacks on the jeep procurement process, this caused a national controversy and the Truman Commission was set up to investigate the procurement. While the congressman and senators had sympathy for Bantam, nothing generally was done about it. America was preparing for war and they did not want to upset the defense build-up.
After the hearings, Ford's win was overturned and Willys was granted the contract. The MA was modified based on the tests and to standardize with other Military vehicles. This produced the first production jeep, the MB.
When Ford heard the Willys won the contract, they went back to the QMC and asked if they could produce jeeps using the Willy's design. An agreement was reached between the QMC, Willys and Ford to do this and they produced the Ford GPW..Bantam wanted to do this as well, but the QMC used one excuse after another to make sure they did not get it. The QMC felt Willys and Ford could produce all the jeeps for the demand, therefore Bantam's re-entry into making jeeps was not warranted.
The early history comes from two articles posted to the Jeep-L mailing list by Todd G. Paisley. Some of the information Todd listed came from the book "The Jeep - It's Development and Procurement Under the Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942" by Herbert R. Rifkind (1943).